卫生部 国家经贸委 工商总局、药监局


卫生部、国家经贸委、工商总局、药品监管局关于开展保健食品专项整治工作的通知


卫法监发[2002]172号

各省、自治区、直辖市卫生厅局，经（商）委、工商局、药监局：
当前，全国各地正在积极贯彻落实国务院关于整顿和规范市场经济秩序的决定精神，集中力量开展了以保健食品等为重点的食品打假专项斗争，取得了阶段性成果。在专项整治工作中，我们发现保健食品市场出现了一些突出问题，如：有的保健食品中擅自添加药物甚至违禁药品；有的保健食品大肆进行虚假广告宣传，甚至违法宣传产品具有治疗作用；有的伪造卫生部门批准文号，冒充保健食品进行经营活动；有的未取得卫生许可证和工商登记，违法生产经营保健食品等等，以上行为严重扰乱了保健食品正常生产经营秩序，给保健食品行业健康发展带来不利影响，社会反响强烈。根据国务院领导批示精神和卫生部、国家工商总局等部门《关于继续深入开展食品打假专项斗争工作的通知》（卫法监发[2002]102号），经研究决定，从现在起直至今年年底，在全国范围内集中开展保健食品专项整治工作。现将有关要求通知如下：
一、突出重点，深入开展专项整治工作
各地在开展专项整治工作中，要突出工作重点，紧紧围绕重点地区、重点市场和重点产品，集中力量开展专项整治工作。
（一）重点地区：各省、自治区和直辖市要根据具体情况确定重点整治的地区、市场和生产企业。
（二）重点市场：食品批发市场（如食品城、食品批发中心等）、保健品批发市场、药品经营企业等。
（三）重点产品主要包括：
1、伪造批准文号或未取得批准文号宣传保健功能的食品。
2、夸大或虚假宣传具有抗疲劳、减肥、美容、促进生长发育等特定保健功能食品，以及违法宣传改善性功能的产品。
3、假冒、仿冒保健食品标志、商标、装潢的产品。
4、擅自添加药食同源原料名单以外，并已列入药典的动植物原料的普通食品。
5、普通食品宣传保健功能。
（四）专项整治的重点内容
1、整顿获得批准证书保健食品的生产秩序，查禁不符合保健食品良好生产规范的生产行为，以及生产有毒有害或者不符合卫生标准的保健食品。
2、整顿保健食品的流通秩序。经营单位要严把进货关，严格查验相关手续，严禁夸大宣称特定的保健功能和名称、标签不符合规定的定型包装食品以及擅自添加违禁药品的保健食品进入销售渠道。
3、整顿保健食品广告宣传秩序，严禁夸大功能宣传或疗效宣传。
4、整顿地方的食品行政审批行为，规范相关批准文号。查禁伪造批准文号、标志的假冒保健食品。
二、严格按照工作目标开展工作
各地要通过保健食品集中专项整治工作，使严重危害人民健康的违法犯罪活动得到有效遏制，争取在今年内取得阶段性成果，实现以下目标：
（一）对保健食品生产企业进行一次全面监督检查。按照危险性分析的原则，提高保健食品生产经营企业的卫生监督管理要求，对不符合要求的要限期进行改进。初步建立保健食品生产经营企业不良记录预警系统和危险性评估系统。通过公示卫生安全合格保健食品和生产企业，促进保健食品产业健康发展。
（二）通过大案要案的查处，揭露和处理一批群众反映强烈、后果严重、影响恶劣的典型案件，保健食品非法宣传、无证无照生产经营和假冒保健食品的活动得到基本遏制。
（三）消费者保健食品法律意识进一步增强，对专项整治工作结果基本满意。
（四）保健食品管理的法规和措施进一步完善。
三、工作步骤
（一）调查摸底阶段（7月）。各地要在收到本通知后1个月内完成部署落实保健食品专项整治的有关工作，对辖区内的所有保健食品生产经营企业及其产品的审查批准情况进行一次全面的摸底调查，登记在册，并根据当地情况确定整顿重点。同时，广泛开展宣传工作，督促企业自查自纠。各省的专项整治方案和确定的重点地区由各部门在7月31日前分别报送相关部委局备案。
（二）专项整治实施阶段（8～11月）。根据工作计划，各地具体开展专项整治活动。要突出抓好大案要案的查处工作，坚持做到“五不放过”。对发现的问题，要追根溯源，一查到底。
（三）督促检查和巩固提高阶段（11～12月）。卫生部将在11月联合有关部门对重点地区的整治工作进行督促检查，调查研究进一步加强保健食品管理的措施和意见。其它地区也要自行开展督促检查工作，进一步巩固整治结果，总结经验，并向社会通报整治情况。各地要在12月10日前上报专项整治总结。
四、具体工作要求
根据《国务院关于整顿和规范市场经济秩序的决定》（国发[2001]11号）要求，保健食品专项整治工作要坚持“地方政府负责，部门协调指导”的工作方针，突出省级地方政府和各有关部门的责任，明确各部门分工，各尽其职、各司其责，并加强协调与配合。要按照以下要求开展工作：
（一）明确职责分工，形成联合整治的合力
1、各级卫生行政部门牵头负责本地区保健食品专项整治工作的组织、协调工作，负责整顿保健食品生产企业、流通经营企业和查禁无证无照生产经营行为。
2、经贸部门负责推进连锁经营、物流配送等新型流通方式，加强保健食品行业管理。
3、工商行政管理部门要依法做好保健食品企业的注册登记工作，依法查处无证照经验行为；加强对经营假冒保健食品和假冒、仿冒保健食品标识、标志、商标及特有名称包装装潢以及对保健食品进行虚假宣传等不正当竞争行为的整治力度，打击扰乱保健食品市场秩序的行为。
4、药监部门负责协助做好食品中禁止添加的违禁药品的监督管理，协助做好保健食品中违禁药品的检验工作。
（二）加强组织领导，落实工作责任
各部门的主要领导要真正负起责任，认真研究落实保健食品专项整治工作，把各项工作任务落实到具体的机构和个人，实行严格的责任制度。要加大人力、物力、财力的投入，确保工作的顺利开展。
（三）加大工作力度，狠抓大案要案
各地要加大对食品生产经营的监督和处罚力度，依法严厉查处违法行为，狠抓一批影响恶劣、社会反映强烈、严重扰乱保健食品市场经济秩序的大案要案，对触犯刑律的，要坚决按照有关规定移送公安、司法机关处理。
（四）加强督查工作，强化责任追究
上级部门要加大对下级部门开展专项整治中重大案件查处的督办工作力度，确保联合行动取得实效。各地区、各部门要制定相应的制度，组建督查队伍和信息沟通网络，使工作做到件件有着落、事事有结果。要严格按照工作目标，逐一将管理责任落实到执法机构和个人，并实现严格的责任追究制。对工作不负责任、措施不力、执法不严、责任不落实、消极应付甚至失职渎职的机构和个人要依法依纪追究管理责任和领导责任。
（五）严格按照确定的重点开展专项整治工作
保健食品专项整治工作的科学性和政策性较强，在制止食品夸大宣传工作中，要科学地界定夸大宣传与营养知识、传统保健常识宣传的区别；在对重点产品进行整治工作中，要将非传统食品形态的定型包装食品列为整治重点。
（六）加大新闻宣传工作力度
要主动与新闻单位联系，形成强大的舆论攻势。要根据各阶段的重点进行宣传，特别是对大案要案的查处，要加大曝光力度，震慑违法犯罪分子。同时，加强地区间的信息沟通工作，并严格按照工作安排进度，及时上报有关材料和信息。

卫生部 国家经贸委 工商总局 药监局
二00二年七月十六日
Chapter VIII
Strengthening of the Multilateral System


Art. 23 of the DSU deals, as indicated by its title, with the “Strengthening of the Multilateral System”. Its overall design is to prevent WTO Members from unilaterally resolving their disputes in respect of WTO rights and obligations. It does so by obligating Members to follow the multilateral rules and procedures of the DSU. Art. 23 of the DSU reads:

“Strengthening of the Multilateral System
1. When Members seek the redress of a violation of obligations or other nullification or impairment of benefits under the covered agreements or an impediment to the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements, they shall have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of this Understanding.
2. In such cases, Members shall:
(a) not make a determination to the effect that a violation has occurred, that benefits have been nullified or impaired or that the attainment of any objective of the covered agreements has been impeded, except through recourse to dispute settlement in accordance with the rules and procedures of this Understanding, and shall make any such determination consistent with the findings contained in the panel or Appellate Body report adopted by the DSB or an arbitration award rendered under this Understanding;
(b) follow the procedures set forth in Article 21 to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings; and
(c) follow the procedures set forth in Article 22 to determine the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations and obtain DSB authorization in accordance with those procedures before suspending concessions or other obligations under the covered agreements in response to the failure of the Member concerned to implement the recommendations and rulings within that reasonable period of time.”

In this section, to end this book, the author means to take a precise overlook on the nature of obligations under Art. 23 of the DSU as a whole by referring to two panels’ reports in part. In this respect, the Panel in US-Sections 301-310 (DS152) rules: 1
“On this basis [provision of Article 23], we conclude as follows:
(a)It is for the WTO through the DSU process - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine that a WTO inconsistency has occurred (Article 23.2(a)).
(b)It is for the WTO or both of the disputing parties, through the procedures set forth in Article 21 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine the reasonable period of time for the Member concerned to implement DSB recommendations and rulings (Article 23.2(b)).
(c)It is for the WTO through the procedures set forth in Article 22 - not for an individual WTO Member - to determine, in the event of disagreement, the level of suspension of concessions or other obligations that can be imposed as a result of a WTO inconsistency, as well as to grant authorization for the actual implementation of these suspensions.
Article 23.2 clearly, thus, prohibits specific instances of unilateral conduct by WTO Members when they seek redress for WTO inconsistencies in any given dispute. This is, in our view, the first type of obligations covered under Article 23.
Article 23.1 is not concerned only with specific instances of violation. It prescribes a general duty of a dual nature. First, it imposes on all Members to ‘have recourse to’ the multilateral process set out in the DSU when they seek the redress of a WTO inconsistency. In these circumstances, Members have to have recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system to the exclusion of any other system, in particular a system of unilateral enforcement of WTO rights and obligations. This, what one could call ‘exclusive dispute resolution clause’, is an important new element of Members' rights and obligations under the DSU. Second, Article 23.1 also prescribes that Members, when they have recourse to the dispute settlement system in the DSU, have to ‘abide by’ the rules and procedures set out in the DSU. This second obligation under Article 23.1 is of a confirmatory nature: when having recourse to the DSU Members must abide by all DSU rules and procedures.
Turning to the second paragraph under Article 23, Article 23.2 - which, on its face, addresses conduct in specific disputes - starts with the words ‘[i]n such cases’. It is, thus, explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1.
Indeed, two of the three prohibitions mentioned in Article 23.2 - Article 23.2(b) and (c) - are but egregious examples of conduct that contradicts the rules and procedures of the DSU which, under the obligation in Article 23.1 to ‘abide by the rules and procedures’ of the DSU, Members are obligated to follow. These rules and procedures clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.
Article 23 interdicts, thus, more than action in specific disputes, it also provides discipline for the general process WTO Members must follow when seeking redress of WTO inconsistencies. A violation of the explicit provisions of Article 23 can, therefore, be of two different kinds. It can be caused
(a)by an ad hoc, specific action in a given dispute, or
(b)by measures of general applicability, e.g. legislation or regulations, providing for a certain process to be followed which does not, say, include recourse to the DSU dispute settlement system or abide by the rules and procedures of the DSU.”
Furthermore, as to Art. 23 of the DSU, the Panel in US-Import Measures (DS165) confirms the ruling developed in US-Sections 301-310, and states: 2
“The Panel believes that the adopted Panel Report on United States - Sections 301-310 of the Trade Act of 1974 (‘US - Section 301’) has confirmed the crucial importance that WTO Members place on the dispute settlement system of the WTO, as the exclusive means to redress any violations of any provisions of the WTO Agreement. This fundamental principle is embedded in Article 23 of the DSU: …
An important reason why Article 23 of the DSU must be interpreted with a view to prohibiting any form of unilateral action is because such unilateral actions threaten the stability and predictability of the multilateral trade system, a necessary component for "market conditions conducive to individual economic activity in national and global markets" which, in themselves, constitute a fundamental goal of the WTO. Unilateral actions are, therefore, contrary to the essence of the multilateral trade system of the WTO. As stated in the Panel Report on US - Section 301:
‘7.75 Providing security and predictability to the multilateral trading system is another central object and purpose of the system which could be instrumental to achieving the broad objectives of the Preamble. Of all WTO disciplines, the DSU is one of the most important instruments to protect the security and predictability of the multilateral trading system and through it that of the market-place and its different operators. DSU provisions must, thus, be interpreted in the light of this object and purpose and in a manner which would most effectively enhance it.’
The structure of Article 23 is that the first paragraph states the general prohibition or general obligation, i.e. when Members seek the redress of a WTO violation, they shall do so only through the DSU. This is a general obligation. Any attempt to seek ‘redress’ can take place only in the institutional framework of the WTO and pursuant to the rules and procedures of the DSU.
The prohibition against unilateral redress in the WTO sectors is more directly provided for in the second paragraph of Article 23. From the ordinary meaning of the terms used in the chapeau of Article 23.2 (‘in such cases, Members shall’), it is also clear that the second paragraph of Article 23 is ‘explicitly linked to, and has to be read together with and subject to, Article 23.1’. That is to say, the specific prohibitions of paragraph 2 of Article 23 have to be understood in the context of the first paragraph, i.e. when such action is performed by a WTO Member with a view to redressing a WTO violation.
We also agree with the US - Section 301 Panel Report that Article 23.2 contains ‘egregious examples of conduct that contradict the rules of the DSU’ and which constitute more specific forms of unilateral actions, otherwise generally prohibited by Article 23.1 of the DSU.
‘[t]hese rules and procedures [Article 23.1] clearly cover much more than the ones specifically mentioned in Article 23.2. There is a great deal more State conduct which can violate the general obligation in Article 23.1 to have recourse to, and abide by, the rules and procedures of the DSU than the instances especially singled out in Article 23.2.’
The same Panel identified a few examples of such instances where the DSU could be violated contrary to the provisions of Article 23. Each time a Member seeking the redress of a WTO violation is not abiding by a rule of the DSU, it thus violates Article 23.1 of the DSU.
In order to verify whether individual provisions of Article 23.2 have been infringed (keeping in mind that the obligation to also observe other DSU provisions can be brought under the umbrella of Article 23.1), we must first determine whether the measure at issue comes under the coverage of Article 23.1. In other words, we need to determine whether Article 23 is applicable to the dispute before addressing the specific violations envisaged in the second paragraph of Article 23 of the DSU or elsewhere in the DSU.
Article 23.1 of the DSU provides that the criterion for determining whether Article 23 is applicable is whether the Member that imposed the measure was ‘seeking the redress of’ a WTO violation. …
The term ‘seeking’ or ‘to seek’ is defined in the Webster New Encyclopedic Dictionary as: ‘to resort to, … to make an attempt, try’. This term would therefore cover situations where an effort is made to redress WTO violations (whether perceived or WTO determined violations). The term ‘to redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as ‘repair (an action); atone for (a misdeed); remedy or remove; to set right or rectify (injury, a wrong, a grievance etc.); obtaining reparation or compensation’. The term ‘redress’ is defined in the New Shorter Oxford English Dictionary as: ‘reparation of or compensation for a wrong or consequent loss; remedy for or relief from some trouble; correction or reformation of something wrong’. The term 'redress' implies, therefore, a reaction by a Member against another Member, because of a perceived (or WTO determined) WTO violation, with a view to remedying the situation.
Article 23.1 of the DSU prescribes that when a WTO Member wants to take any remedial action in response to what it views as a WTO violation, it is obligated to have recourse to and abide by the DSU rules and procedures. In case of a grievance on a WTO matter, the WTO dispute settlement mechanism is the only means available to WTO Members to obtain relief, and only the remedial actions envisaged in the WTO system can be used by WTO Members. The remedial actions relate to restoring the balance of rights and obligations which form the basis of the WTO Agreement, and include the removal of the inconsistent measure, the possibility of (temporary) compensation and, in last resort, the (temporary) suspension of concessions or other obligations authorised by the DSB (Articles 3.7 and 22.1 of the DSU). The latter remedy is essentially retaliatory in nature.”



【NOTE】:
1. See, in detail, WT/DS152/R/7.38-7.46.
2. See, in detail, WT/DS165/R/6.13-6.23.



List of References

1 Sources of Legal Texts: http://www.wto.org; WTO Secretariat: The WTO Dispute Settlement Procedures (Second Edition), CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS, 2001.